Can a Religious Person be a Big Firm Litigator? by Uelmen, Amelia J.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 26 | Number 4 Article 4
1999
Can a Religious Person be a Big Firm Litigator?
Amelia J. Uelmen
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amelia J. Uelmen, Can a Religious Person be a Big Firm Litigator? , 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1069 (1999).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol26/iss4/4
CAN A RELIGIOUS PERSON BE A BIG
FIRM LITIGATOR?
Amelia J. Uelmen*
Introduction
In certain mid-town Manhattan elevators, just coupling the
words "religion" and "lawyering" is enough to stop conversations,
turn heads and draw out comments of disbelief and intense curios-
ity. In the world of large corporate law firms, what could religion
have to do with lawyering? To many business lawyers, religious
values appear "personal" and so out of context.
Other kinds of legal practice seem to lend themselves much
more readily to a direct application of personal and religious val-
ues. Providing direct legal services to the poor or the oppressed,
for example, fits neatly with the convictions of those attentive to
biblical admonitions to work for justice and to serve the needy.'
Many who have gravitated towards public interest law can say with
complete sincerity and coherence, "religion made me do it."2 Ar-
eas of practice that involve counseling individual clients also seem
to leave room for integrating personal and religious values into
various aspects of the lawyer-client relationship. Particularly
where legal counseling and advice involve personal matters, it is
not difficult to imagine the potential for lawyer and client to form a
* Associate, Arnold & Porter (New York); J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1993; B.A. (American Studies), Georgetown University, 1990. I am deeply
grateful to Arnold & Porter for its flexibility in allowing me to work part-time while
writing this Essay. Thanks also to many friends and colleagues from Arnold & Porter,
the Focolare Movement, and the Auburn-Stein-Finkelstein program on Religious Val-
ues and the Practice of Law, and to Joseph Allegretti, Clark Cunningham, David Da-
vidson, Mary Ann Glendon, Steven Goldberg, Leslie Griffin, John Healy, Howard
Lesnick, James Nolan and Russell Pearce for their suggestions and encouragement.
Particular thanks to my parents, Gerald and Martha Uelmen, and to David Butow,
Deborah Goldberg, Paul Mandell, Anthony O'Donnell and Andrew Ratzkin who
took the time for extensive comments and discussions.
1. See, e.g., Isaiah 1:17 ("Seek justice, undo oppression; defend the fatherless,
plead for the widow."); Matthew 25:31-46 ("Whatever you did for one of the least of
these brothers of mine, you did it for me.").
2. Ashley T. Wiltshire, Religion and Lifework in the Law, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
1383, 1383 (1996) ("For many of us who work for the poor or marginalized, the under-
lying motivation is there: religion made us do it. Truth to tell, the motivation is there
whether we admit or not.").
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"moral community" based on which they exchange information
and make decisions. 3
In contrast, service to the poor or marginalized is not usually the
mission of the large corporate law firm. It is especially difficult, for
an associate, to imagine creating a "moral community" with a cor-
porate client. To those who would like to integrate personal and
religious values into their lives as lawyers but find themselves prac-
ticing in a large firm, the common suggestion is to dabble in pro
bono legal services to the poor or to organizations that serve the
oppressed or downtrodden of society.4 At least in this way, these
lawyers can share in the areas of practice that leave room to inte-
grate personal and religious values.
As for the day-to-day work at large firms, many have concluded
that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find spiritual meaning.5
If you really want to be a person who fully integrates personal or
religious values into your work, the suggestion is, more often than
not, get out.6 At a big firm, "religious lawyering" is an oxymoron.
Or is it? Does it have to be? In this Essay, I take on the chal-
lenge of describing some of the ways in which values often defined
3. See Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective
on Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1121 (1998) (discussing
"covenant" model of lawyer-client relationship in which each party affirms the others
as loved by God, and each is answerable to the other). See generally JOSEPH AL-
LEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING ch. 3 (1996) [hereinafter THE LAWYER'S CALL-
ING] (contrasting contract with covenant model of lawyer-client relationship).
4. See, e.g., N. Lee Cooper, Religion and the Lawyer, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1083,
1085 (1998) ("Even if our own practices are geared toward FERC regulation or cor-
porate finance, whose benefits may appear abstract to the individual, there is always a
wealth of pro bono opportunities available."). See also Nitza Milagros Escalera, A
Christian Lawyer's Mandate to Provide Pro Bono Publico Service, 66"IFORDHAM L.
REV. 1393, 1393 (1998) ("NOwhere is the lawyer's religious obligation more evident
than in the area of pro bono publico service."). See generally THE LAW FIRM AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD (Robert A. Katzman ed., 1995) (discussing the role of large law
firms in addressing the needs of those who cannot afford legal services).
5. See, e.g., James M. Jenkins, What Does Religion Have to Do With Legal Ethics?
A Response to Professor Allegretti, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1167, 1168 (in mid-sized to
large firms, "[c]hanging what is perhaps only legal piecework that is totally imper-
sonal into a covenant relationship may simply be impossible").
6. See, e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, On Being a Muslim Corporate Lawyer, 27 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 947, 951 (1996) (describing exit from large firm practice after conclud-
ing "the world of law firms had something fundamentally wrong with it"); William
Bentley Ball, On Hoping to Be, Being, and Having Been, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1005,
1005 (1996) (describing transition from corporate work to cases involving protection
of religious freedom, out of a "deep need" to "serve better causes"). See also Jenkins,
supra note 5, at 1167 (noting distinct nature and difficulties of large firm corporate
practice); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 378 (1993) (If a practitioner
"takes the ideal of the lawyer-statesman seriously ... the first thing he should do is
stay clear of [large-firm practice].").
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as "personal" or "religious" can be integrated into the practice of
law at a large firm.7 Part I describes some of the aspects of big firm
practice that make it particularly difficult to integrate religious and
personal values which may give meaning to one's work. Part II
suggests that such meaning can be found through a religious vision
of what it means to be a person, which includes a sense of obliga-
tion to serve the common good. Part III explores how this concept
might interface with the ideals, duties and culture of the legal pro-
fession. Part IV extends this analysis to the context of a practice
that serves big business. Finally, Part V ponders how such a notion
may be applied in the specific context of big firm litigation practice.
I conclude with hope that the profession will make room for the
substantive contribution that lawyers with a religious vision of the
human person and of the common good can bring to the public
discourse and the practice of law, even in the context of big firm
practice.
I. The Particular Difficulties of Big Firm Practice
In the effort to integrate personal and religious values into one's
day to day legal work, what is particularly difficult about the con-
text of large firms which service primarily business and commercial
interests? Alasdair MacIntyre explains, "Any contemporary at-
tempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity" will en-
counter "two different kinds of obstacles, one social and the other
philosophical."'8 "The social obstacles derive from the way in
which modernity partitions each human life into a variety of seg-
ments, each with its own norms and modes of behavior. So work is
divided froni leisure, private life from public, the corporate from
the.-personal." 9
In large and diverse corporate environments, work life is or-
dered according to a certain "public square" cultural etiquette.
The Establishment Clause "wall of separation" metaphor is applied
7. This focus is certainly not to discourage anyone from setting aside time for pro
bono work. In fact, for many associates at large firms, a firm's encouragement and
realistic accommodation of pro bono work is at the top of the list of criteria for decid-
ing where to go. Some firms do a better job than -others. A tip for students who
would like a "reality check" about a firm's'attitude towards pro bono time allowed: in
counting hours for the purpose of minimum requirements or bonuses, ask whether
time spent on pro bono projects is lumped together with the billable hours. If not, a
policy of "encouraging pro bono" may in reality translate into whatever you can fit in
between one and two in the morning.
8. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 204
(2d ed. 1984).
9. Id. at 204.
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as a cultural guide: religion is placed in the "private" - read "not
work" - sphere. As the Supreme Court proclaimed in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, "The Constitution decrees that religion must be a pri-
vate matter for the individual, the family, and institutions of pri-
vate choice."' 10
"Lawyers for people"" a seem to have more room than corporate
lawyers to envision their work as a unity with their personal beliefs.
An individual attorney-client relationship is arguably an "institu-
tion of private choice," in the sense that the client and the attorney
can agree to give to the relationship the shape and meaning they
wish. If they would like to permeate it with religious values, or any
other kind of values, they are certainly free to do that, so long as
the relationship is lawful and within the standards of professional
ethics. In contrast, because big firms which service big business
have more of a "public square" feel, we are not sure it is appropri-
ate, or even permissible, to apply to our work in the market square
values that are often framed as matters of personal belief or private
morality. There could be "something troubling or even wicked"' 2
about the injection of personal and religious values into this
context.'
3
According to Maclntyre, the philosophical obstacles derive from
two tendencies. The first is the tendency to think atomistically
about human action and to analyze complex projects and transac-
10. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
11. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 63 ('1994) ("Why do
corporate lawyers and lawyers for 'people' move past each other in the legal system
like bishops of different colors on a chessboard?").
12. See Stephen L. Carter, Introduction to Faith and Law Symposium, 27 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 925, 926 (1996) (arguing against the vision that "[p]art of the trouble
with moral lawyering today is the weird steady drumbeat, in some parts of our politics
and most parts of our law, that there is something troubling or even wicked about the
explicit (or maybe even implicit) import of religious values into the public square, the
place where we hold our public policy debates").
13. 1 realize I run the risk of idealizing and oversimplifying the individual attor-
ney-client relationship, particularly because I have little direct exposure to it. Un-
doubtedly "lawyers for people" and corporate lawyers face many similar concerns.
See generally THE LAWYER'S CALLING, supra note 3 (discussing challenges applicable
to both lawyers for individuals and lawyers for large corporations). For example, indi-
vidual clients can use their lawyers as a means to an end, just like corporate clients.
And certain corporate lawyers with a certain level of power can and do create "moral
communities" with their corporate clients. Here, however, I would like to focus on
the structural point: the face-to-face and more personal nature of the individual attor-
ney-client relationship lends itself more easily to the integration of personal and reli-
gious values than the big firm-big business relationship.
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tions in terms of simple components. The second is the tendency to
separate the individual from the roles that he or she plays. 4
The first is particularly prevalent in big firm practice. Because of
the specialized nature of the services large firms provide to large
businesses and the hierarchical structure of large firms, complex
actions and transactions tend to be broken into tiny pieces. In the
corporate context, it is not rare for individual lawyers to feel not
that they are engaged in a relationship with the client, but rather
are performing impersonal micro-specialized piecework. 15 This
tends to make the legal work quite anonymous. The sophisticated
business client, often a lawyer, is probably more interested in buy-
ing a means to an end than in forming a "moral community" or
discussing the overall social impact of business decisions.
The second philosophical obstacle, the tendency to separate the
person from the role that he or she plays, is not particular to big
firm practice. But in the corporate world, the heightened sense
that there is "something troubling" about bringing religious and
personal values to bear on one's work can make the search for al-
ternatives more difficult. 16 According to prevailing interpretations
of the norms gbverning our adversarial system, a lawyer's role is
to act "with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."17 As Deb-
orah Rhode described, "[t]he assumption underpinning bar
ethical codes is that the most effective way to discover the truth
and preserve rights is through an adversarial process in which
lawyers have 'undivided fidelity to each client's interests as the
client perceives them."1 8 The assumption also is expressed in the
14. MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 204.
15. See Jenkins, supra note 5, at 1168 ("In my experience, a client is not likely to
hire a lawyer to be sympathetic or understanding or to become a friend or a supporter
in a covenant relationship, although the client may want all these things and may even
get them. What he really seeks is a lawyer well versed in his area of need who will
correctly analyze the matter and give competent and totally objective advice - with-
out being influenced by the personal relationship. The client is more likely to want a
correct opinion than a caring one.").
16. Cf. THE LAWYER'S CALLING, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing creative alterna-
tive dispute resolutions, including Christian conciliation centers in which Christians
can being their disputes in order to obtain non legal remedies).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt.[1] (1998) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL RULES].
18. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
283, 312 (1998) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism Problem] (quoting American
Lawyer's Code of Conduct Ch. II cmt (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers foun-
dation 1982), reprinted in STEVEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 323, 335 (1989)).
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wide-spread and powerful metaphor of the lawyer as the "hired
gun."1
9
One celebrated definition of the advocate's role emerged from
the 1820 trial in which King George IV sought to divorce his wife
Queen Caroline. Her attorney, Lord Brougham, threatened to de-
fend her by proving the King's own adultery and secret marriage to
a Catholic, which would have required the King to abdicate the
throne. In response to criticism that good citizenship required him
to refrain from making such an argument, Lord Brougham
responded:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client
by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to
other persons, and among them, to himself, is his first and only
duty. In performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he. may bring upon others. Sep-
arating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion.2 °
Gerald Uelmen described the model of undivided fidelity as par-
ticularly compelling in the criminal defense context.
A lawyer can, and probably should, advise a client that a partic-
ular position or argument may hurt the best interests of the
country. The choice of whether to forgo the advantage, how-
ever, must be left to the client. In a criminal case, where the life
or liberty of the client is at stake, it will be a rather unusual
client who will say, "I'd rather go to jail - or be gassed or elec-
trocuted - than imperil the interests of my country.?k
19. See THE LAWYER'S CALLING, supra note 3, at 65 (The "standard" vision 6f'the
lawyer's role includes partisanship: "the lawyer is a partisan who owes his undivided
allegiance to his client and who does whatever it takes to achieve his client's goals.").
20. Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citi-
zens, 30 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 119, 119-20 (1996) (quoting DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 189 (1973) (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (London,
J. Robins & Co. Albion Press 1820-21)). For a critique of the "Uelmen-Brougham"
model which Gerald Uelmen described as watching himself being sliced up and
served for dinner, but with such elegant presentation that he did not mind, see Albert
W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and
the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 291 (1998); Letter from G.
Uelmen to Alschuler (on file with the author). See also Russell G. Pearce, Redis-
covering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
241, 257-58 (1992) (discussing George Sharswood's 1854 essay on legal ethics, which
rejected the Brougham model of advocacy).
21. G. Uelmen, supra note 20, at 122; see also Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W.
Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 988
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While the Brougham model may have particular weight in the
criminal context, it does not necessarily follow that in all contexts
lawyers should be "reckless of consequences." Yet there are many
indications that in business counseling and civil litigation the con-
cept of "knowing but one person" is often swallowed whole.22
Deborah Rhode described the "considerable personal price" a
lawyer's refuge in role can extract:
When professional action becomes detached from ordinary
moral experience, lawyers' sensitivity can atrophy or narrow to
fit the constructed universe dictated by role. The agnosticism
that advocacy purportedly entails can readily become a defining
feature of one's total personality. Such a perspective offers the
illusion of freedom from responsibility, while in fact delimiting
individuals' moral autonomy. At best, the result is likely to be a
resigned submission. At worst, it can foster an enervating cyni-
cism. Success is gauged by victories, not values, and profes-
sional idealism is dismissed as pompous rhetoric. 23
Chillingly bleak. My personal values and beliefs have nothing to
do with my work as a lawyer and there seems to be so little room to
think about the big picture of how my work fits in with society as a
whole. I bury myself in the minute task at hand, and put blinders
on to the larger impact of my work. As time passes, I become
more and more fragmented within, and convinced that I am an am-
bivalent cog in the great machine that keeps Corporate America
running, for better or worse.24 No wonder recent reflections de-
scribe lawyers as lost 25 and the legal profession as betrayed.26
What have we lost? How have we been betrayed? Whom do we
betray? I submit it is not simply the sense of what it means to be a
(1995) (suggesting that partisan model of advocacy may be more justified in criminal
defense context).
22. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice (Symposium on
the Corporate Law Firm), 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605-08 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives]. See also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 64 (1988) (noting faulty application of criminal paradigm to civil context;
"wealthy civil litigants may enjoy precisely the same advantages as the state in most
criminal proceedings: enormous resources for the investigation and hiring of exper-
tise, imbalances in bargaining strengths; and legal counsel that is relatively uncon-
strained by budgetary limits").
23. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 626.
24. For some the ambivalence may be closer to the surface than for others. But I
am convinced that even those who seem to have whole-heartedly taken on the role
often harbor deep doubts within.
25. See KRONMAN, supra note 6.
26. See SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
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lawyer. We lose, we betray, the sense of what it means to be a
person. How can we find it again?
II. On Being a Person
Big firm practice reflects some of the most profound difficulties
in the search for meaning: human life is partitioned into segments,
human action is atomized into components and the essence of the
human being is severed from the role that he or she plays. In light
of these difficulties, how can we arrive at a more complete under-
standing of what it means to be a person, a vision of human life as a
whole, as a unity?
Aristotle put together many of the pieces in his fundamental in-
sight into the social nature of the human being - "Since 'man is by
nature a political [or social] animal' who cannot be self sufficient
(fully realized) as a human being in isolation from others, but
rather can achieve such self-sufficiency only in a voluntary commu-
nity of friends, 'the chief end, both of individuals and states,' is the
attainment of the common good of the citizens of the state through
the creation and maintenance of such a community."27
Virtue ethics focuses, at least initially, on the nature of the per-
son rather than the person's acts. It asks what sort of person one
ought to be, what sort of life one ought to live, and not, at least in
the first instance, what acts one ought to do. 8 The essence of my
nature as a person is to work to create and maintain the commu-
nity. My "chief end" is to work for the common good. Volumes,
entire libraries, have been written on what is the common good,
how it can be attained, whether it can be attained and whether it
can even be defined. 9
27. Richard Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 684-85
(1992) (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1.2 at 1252b28-1253a18; 111.6 at 1278b15-25;
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1.7 at 1097b8-11; VIII.9 at 1159b25-1160a14; IX.9 at 1169b3-
21 (B. Jowett trans.) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes
ed., Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton Univ. Press 1984)).
28. See Ruth Anna Putnam, Reciprocity and Virtue Ethics, 98 ETHICS 379 (1988).
See also Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1998) (listing ramifications of Aristotelian perspective; "eth-
ics is about what kind of life we will live").
29. See, e.g., PHILIP SLEZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY
AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 524-38 (1992) (discussing philosophical and social
theories which resist the idea of the common good); MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 232
("In a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the community's good
as specified by the good for man, there can no longer either be any very substantial
concept of what it is to contribute more or less to the achievement of that good.").
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Without a religious point of reference, one can, as did Aristotle,
arrive at and articulate a definition of the person as being in rela-
tionship with the community, and to have as one's chief end the
common good.30 But it is undoubtedly difficult to maintain such a
vision, and even more difficult to act accordingly in daily life. As
human beings, we tend to turn in on ourselves, to be taken by
greed and enchanted by power. At the very least, we are often
unable to rise above the narrow interests and affections directly
before us, unable to discern the "crucial distinction between what
any particular individual at any particular time takes to be good for
him and what is really good for him as a man. "31
Religious reflection and experience have provided not only rich
insights into the nature of the human person, the community, and
the definition of the common good, 32 but also a guide to under-
standing the implications of the vision in daily life, and a source of
strength to live accordingly. For purposes of discussion, it might be
useful to define religion. The Latin root of the word religion
means "to tie back," or "to bind together again. ' 33 Religious tradi-
tion and experience "bind together again"' - the person with
God, the person within, in an inner unity and integrity, and the
person with others, with the community. Acts of worship and con-
duct in accordance with a set of norms or commands are not the
heart of religion, but rather expressions of these relationships -
expressions of how the person, God and the community are bound
together.4
. 30. Aristotle's definition of the human person serves as the basis of some discus-
sions of lawyering that do not include an explicitly religious point of reference. See,
e.g., KRONMAN supra note 6, at 31-2 (describing the new republicans rejection of the
assumption that political action is essentially private in nature: "the point of political
action is not always to obtain something the actors antecedently want - to satisfy a
pre-political desire - but sometimes to determine instead what it is they ought to
want, to decide what their interests shall be, and not merely to pursue the ones they
already have"); Luban supra note 22, at 126-27 (describing the moral limit to a law-
yer's partisan zeal based in responsibility to a vulnerable non-client, to whom the
lawyer is related by the fact of common humanity).
31. MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 150.
32. In discussing definitions of the person and the common good, I will refer to the
texts and traditions of the Roman Catholic Church because I am a Catholic and be-
cause these are the texts and traditions with which I am most familiar.
33. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1918 (3d ed. 1986).
34. See Joseph Boyle, Duties to Others in Roman Catholic Thought, in DUTIES TO
OTHERS 73, 84 (Courtney S. Campbell & B. Andrew Lustig eds., 1994) ("[Mloral
norms are not, on the Catholic conception, arbitrary impositions by God. They are
not tests set up to make life difficult, but the demands of our own rational natures.
According to natural law theory, morality is a participation by rational creatures in
God's providence so that they may guide their lives to what is genuinely good. Thus,
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Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council's Pastoral Consti-
tution on the Church and the Modern World, describes the "inter-
dependence between personal betterment and the improvement of
society. 35
Insofar as man by his very nature stands completely in need of
life in society, he is and he ought to be the beginning, the subject
and the object of every social organization. Life in society is not
something accessory to man himself: through his dealings with
others, through mutual service, and through fraternal dialogue,
man develops all his talents and becomes able to rise to his
destiny.36
Thus, relationships with other people are not simply a reality the
person needs in order to function. These relationships are intrinsic
to the definition of the person. It is only in relationship with other
people that the person is fulfilled. To illustrate, the "person" can
be defined in contrast to the "individual." An "individual" needs
only himself, and sees the other only as an external functional aid.
In the "person," on the other hand, "the other opens one's individ-
uality, bringing one beyond one's self, in order to complete one's
self."'37 To have others as a point of reference is not an obstacle to
fulfillment, but rather a possibility - the chance to escape from
the narrow dimension of the self, from a vicious circle of individu-
alism, to enter into the richer dimension of community.38
the reason which provides the basis for moral norms is a person's own reason, not
something alien or imposed." (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Question 91, Answer 2)).
35. Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World
in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS n.25
(Austin Flannery, O.P., ed. 1975) (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ETHICS, Lect. 1). The
documents from the Second Vatican Council, which convened in four sessions from
1962 to 1965, reflect the Catholic Church's aggiornamento (updating) regarding vari-
ous aspects of its internal life and its role in modern society. The title Gaudium et
Spes, "the joy and hope," is from the first words of the document: "The joy and hope,
the grief and anguish of the men of our time, especially those who are poor or af-
flicted in any way, are the joy and hope, the grief and anguish of the followers of
Christ as well." Id. at n.1.
36. Id. at n.25.
37. Luigino Bruni, Relazionalitd e Scienza Economica [Relationality and Eco-
nomic Science], ("Bruni"), 19 NUOVA UMANITA 437, 440, nn.3-4 (1997) (quoting the
Italian philosopher Giusseppe Zanghi) (throughout this essay, the translations from
the original Italian are my own). See also id. at 451 ("to amputate from the human
being his relational component means to put at the basis of economic science a carica-
ture, something which is profoundly different from what the human being is"). Nuova
Umanitd [New Humanity] is an interdisciplinary journal of culture published in Italy.
38. See Mario Gecchele, L "altro" indispensabile [The Indispensible Other], 18
NUOVA UMANITA 577, 581, n.18 (1996) (discussing ideas of the French philosopher
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After defining the person as the focal point of every social or-
ganization, Gaudium et Spes defines the "common good" as "the
sum total of social conditions that allow people, either as groups or
as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more eas-
ily."3 9 The consequent obligation is that "[e]very group must take
into account the needs and legitimate aspirations of every other
group, and still more of the human family as a whole."40 As such,
the common good is that which a person reaches only if it includes
as a consequence, the good of the others.41
Religious reflection brings me to a sense of obligation - not
because of an external command, but rather out of an internal con-
viction about the essence of my nature as a person and the conse-
quent relationships with God and with others. Listening to God
within, I understand who I am as a person and feel the desire to
correspond to that reality in my daily life. It is not a burden, but a
joyous and grateful response in the context of a relationship.
Based on religious reflection, I arrive at the conclusion that if I
would like to be a person, to be fully human, I must keep before
me a vision of the common good, I must live according to the impli-
cations of this vision in every aspect of my life.42
. Let's be clear about the stakes: asking me not to act in accord
with this sense of obligation, not to take it into consideration in
every aspect of my daily life, is to ask me to let go of my deepest
sense of what it means to be a person.
Mounier). See also id. at 582-85 (discussing reflections of Martin Buber);
MACINTYRE, supra note 8.
39. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 35, at 9. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 517 (1995) ("In keeping with the social nature of man, the good of each
individual is necessarily related to the common good, which in turn can be defined
only in reference to the human person.").
40. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 35, at 9. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 518 ("[T]he common good presupposes respect for the person as such ... the
social well-being and development of the group itself.., and the stability and security
of a just order.").
41. See Antonio Maria Baggio, Trinitd e Politica. Riflessione su alcune categorie
politiche alla luce della rivelazione trinitaria [Trinity and Politics: Reflections on a Few
Political Categories in the Light of Trinitarian Revelation], 19 NUOVA UMANITA 727,
788 (1997).
42. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Maybe a Lawyer Can be A Servant; If Not.. ., 27 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1345, 1345 (1996) (describing the natureof a religious heritage as "an
awesome, demanding, put-it-absolutely-first set of habits, propositions, and pressures.
It is not something to be reconciled with something else, not something that informs
some other thing that is in need of being informed. It is, rather, dissonance with faith
that must be reconciled with faith. Whatever is not consistent with faith must be
conformed, not informed.").
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HI. On Being a Person Who is a Lawyer
Logically, I would bring this sense of obligation to my work as a
lawyer. As a person who is a lawyer, my work must be an expres-
sion of the fact that my "chief end" is to work to maintain the com-
munity, to attain the common good.43 If this must is understood in
all its uncompromising strength, is there any room for me in the
profession? Particularly, if the source of this must is grounded in
religious reflection, is there "something troubling or even
wicked"" about bringing it to bear on my daily work as lawyer?
A. A Religious Lawyer's Substantive Contribution to
the Profession
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to consider to what extent
professional traditions and current ethical standards address
whether in advising clients and making decisions a lawyer must in-
clude broader considerations of morality and the common good. If
this concept is already included in professional norms, we can at
least entertain the notion that a religiously grounded sense of this
obligation would be a "merely contingent" aspect of the self which
can be "bleached out" of professional life with no great loss. 4 5
The concept that a lawyer is to work for the public good is not
foreign to the ideals of the profession.46 It is prominent in
Anthony Kronman's description of the "classical nineteenth cen-
tury form" of the "lawyer-statesman": "The outstanding lawyer, as
this ideal present him, is to begin with, a devoted citizen. He cares
about the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well be-
ing for it, unlike those who use the law merely to advance their
private ends."47 As former federal judge Simon Rifkind described:
43. Concern for the common good is only one aspect of the contribution that a
religious person can bring to a workplace. For an insightful discussion of other as-
pects, see Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1469, 1473 (1998) (discussing religious qualities in terms of obligation, inte-
gration, and transcendence). In this Essay I concentrate on the common good for the
purpose of focus.
44. Carter, supra note 12, at 926.
45. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Con-
struction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578 (1993) (describing
the "professional project" as "the 'bleaching out' of merely contingent aspects of the
self, including the residue or particularistic socialization that we refer to as our
'conscience''').
46. See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 592-93 ("[L]iterature has
long hosted laments for some happier era when law was a profession, not a business,
and lawyers were stewards of societal values, not servants of private profit.").
47. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 14; see also id. at 35 (describing the lawyer-states-
man as a public-spirited participant in deliberative debates concerning the meaning of
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"The advocate has more than a private fiduciary relationship with a
client; he also has a public trust .... In his counseling and planning
functions, the attorney not only expedites his client's wishes and
lightens the work load of the courts; he enforces the law as well."
48
While some have questioned whether in reality the ideal ever ex-
isted, and if it did, whether the reality was so ideal, 9 one need not
search long to find descriptions of lawyers as servants of the public
good.
On the other hand, the codes of professional ethics contain very
limited references to when a lawyer must place concern for the
community over an individual client's requests and goals. In the
Model Rule for the scope of representation, the only explicit "shall
not" is that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.
50
To the extent that a religious lawyer brings to the profession a
sense of obligation to the common good that extends beyond
avoiding participation in criminal activity and fraud, this is a value
not already contained within the professional code. 1 Thus this
value could not be described as a "merely contingent" aspect of the
self which can be "bleached out" of the profession with no great
loss.
The may is on the books. The Preamble to the Model Rules
reads: "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice."52 Specifically, Model Rule 2.1 provides: "In
the common good); id. at 36 (at the core of the federalist-republican culture is "the
simple but potent idea that lawyers have an obligation to serve the public good -
consciously to promote not only their clients private interests but also the integrity of
the rules and institutions which form the framework within which these interests ex-
ist"); Robert Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV.
255, 258 (1990) ("The ideal of law as a public profession ... supposes that lawyers will
develop some vision of the common good or public interest, and try to realize it in
their practices, if necessary against the immediate wishes of their clients.").
48. LINOWITZ, supra note 26, at 3-4 (quoting SIMON H. RIFKIND, ONE MAN'S
WORD 502-03 (New York, privately printed 1986)).
49. See, e.g., Rhode, Professionalism Problem, supra note 18, at 304 (questioning
whether the ideal ever existed: "virtually every era that modem commentators ap-
plaud attracted its own share of critics with concerns often paralleling those of to-
day"); LINOWITZ, supra note 26, at 5-9 (noting imperfections of mid-century legal
practice, including exclusion of those who were not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants).
50. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d).
51. See Gordon, supra note 47, at 278 ("The disciplinary codes give almost no
support to the compliance counselor's role."); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note
22, at 625 (stating that if individual or corporate clients ignore ethical advice, the bar
acknowledges no responsibility to withhold further assistance).
52. MODEL RULES Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities [1] (1998).
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rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation. ' 53 The comment to
Model Rule 2.1 notes, "It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant
moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. ''54
But in the context of duties that are more emphasized in prac-
tice, the space for bringing to bear ethical and moral considerations
seems quite limited. Interfacing concern for the common good
with the duty to act with zeal on a client's behalf 55 and the duty of
loyalty, 6 the question arises whether a lawyer whose vision of the
common good clashes with the client's vision of its own objectives
would not have a conflict of interest.5 7 Particularly if a lawyer's
vision of the common good is grounded in religious reflection, it
could be considered a "personal social viewpoint" which should
not be allowed to "dilute" the zeal with which he represents a par-
ticular client's interest. An annotation to Rule 1.2 warns: "A law-
yer may not allow personal interests and loyalties, including
political or social viewpoints, to dilute the diligence or vigor with
which a client is represented."58
According to the rules of professional responsibility, a lawyer
"may" bring in considerations of ethics and morals, but in practice,
references to the common good, if not legally required, are not
common. As Deborah Rhode observed, the premise underlying
most commentary and interpretation of codes of professional eth-
ics is an assumption for "a societal preference for individual over
collective interests."59 For example, the American Trial Lawyers
53. Id. Rule 2.1.
54. Id. Rule 2.1 cmt. 2. Accord MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-8 [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be
confined to purely legal considerations .... In assisting his client to reach a proper
decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors [that] may lead to
a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible."). See also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 691, 695 (1992) ("With regard to
interjection of personal, moral and prudential values, under the governing rules of
professional ethics the lawyer has the authority and at times the duty to be
assertive.").
55. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. 1; see also MODEL CODE Canon 7 ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.").
56. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty is an essential element in
the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
57. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the represen-
tation of the client may be materially limited by ... the lawyer's own interests.").
58. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decision
Making, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 38 n.77 (1997) (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED, Rule 1.2 commentary at 22 (1996)).
59. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 605.
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Code of Conduct provides: "In a society such as ours, which places
the highest value on the dignity and autonomy of the individual,
lawyers serve the public interest by undivided fidelity to each cli-
ent's interests as the client perceives them."6 Some are concerned
that an attempt to incorporate duties to the common good into
codes of professional responsibility would be a move toward "total-
itarianism." "[A]ny effort to place the 'interests of society over the
interests of the individual ... [represents] a very significant move
toward totalitarianism. It makes the lawyer the agent of the
state. "61
This is a place where a religious lawyer could bring an important
contribution to the practice of law. Substantively, it consists in this:
a must that highlights the may. Moved by the sense that I must
bring concern for the common good to bear on my legal work, I
search out and highlight the practical opportunities in which I may
incorporate ethical and moral considerations. Thus, the may which
is on the books but buried in practice shines out in its full potential
to critique unrestrained individualism and recapture the lawyer's
duty to serve the public good. Because the source of this must is
grounded in religious reflection and personal obligation rather
than a duty imposed by the state, the "move toward totalitarian-
ism" is not a concern.62 Arguably such an effort would embody
the highest ideals of the profession. But it would also raise some
eyebrows, particularly if grounded in and motivated by religious
reflection. Why?
B. Cultural Barriers
Behind the raised eyebrows would be a cultural analysis that
goes something like this: we live in a pluralistic society in which a
"wall of separation" functions as a powerful cultural metaphor. It
delineates "a permanent separation of the spheres of religious ac-
tivity and civil authority. '6 3 "The Constitution decrees that reli-
60. Id. (quoting RoscoE POUND AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION
[ATLA] CODE OF CONDUCT comment, at 202 (1981)).
61. Id. at 607 (citing Monroe Freedman's explanation of objections to the Kutak
draft).
62. It would be interesting to explore whether some concern for the common good
could and/or should be included in codes of professional responsibility as a profes-
sional obligation. This discussion is beyond the scope of this Essay.
63. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-2 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
The dissent's reasoning is noted because it has been quite influential in subsequent
Establishment Clause analysis.
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gion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and
institutions of private choice. '"64
True, the wall metaphor refers to an interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause,6" which limits state action, not private activity.
This constraint on government does not per se apply to the internal
life of most private workplaces, including most large corporations
and large law firms. Nonetheless, there is something attractive
about the wall that has led to its application as a cultural guide for
many aspects of our life in the "public square" of the workplace.
Particularly in large and diverse workplaces, it just seems prudent
and perhaps easier to try as much as possible to bracket discussions
about religious beliefs and how they might apply in the workplace
because we would like to avoid treading into potentially divisive
territory.
Thus cultural etiquette advises us to keep religion in the private
- i.e. "not work" - sphere. Personal moral visions of our life as a
community - particularly those grounded in religious belief -
should be, at most, discussed only with those who explicitly consent
to such conversations. Otherwise, there is the very real danger that
people in power, including lawyers, will "impose" their personal
moral or religious views on others.66
The criterion for deciding what kind of values can be brought
into the public square is "whether they are shared by others." For
lawyers, the best indication of whether values are "shared" enough
is whether these values are already included in codes of profes-
sional responsibility. Those values that are "contingent, or not
shared by others" should be, in Sanford Levinson's terms,
"bleached out" of professional life.67 Bluntly, I should keep my
must to myself. I can agonize over it privately, but it is inappropri-
64. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
66. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT
CENTERED APPROACH 279 (1991) ("[T]hough you may ultimately provide a client
who asks for it with your opinion, you should do so only after you have counseled a
client thoroughly enough that you can base your opinion on the client's subjective
values, not on your own.").
67. See Levinson, supra note 45, at 1578 (Professional norms require "the 'bleach-
ing out' of merely contingent aspects of the self, including the residue or particularis-
tic socialization that we refer to as our 'conscience."'); see also Richard A. Matasar,
The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REV. 975, 983 (1990) ("Those who are
willing to acknowledge that their values are contingent, or not shared by others who
may in fact have it right, may well be able to adjust to professional norms.").
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ate for me to bring it to bear on my work in a law firm with busi-
ness clients.68
Hypothetical examples of how lawyers attempt to bring their
religious beliefs to bear on their work illustrate where such an anal-
ysis makes sense. For example, Bruce Green portrays Upright, a
legal ethics expert, who is consulted about whether to disclose to
the authorities a partner's fraudulent billing practices. Unknown
to the client, Upright "possesses a personal moral and religious
view that it is improper to 'snitch' on friends, family, colleagues,
and others with whom one has a relationship."69 There does seem
to be "something troubling or even wicked" about Upright bring-
ing this religious view to bear in his legal counseling, particularly
since such belief is unknown to the client, and because the client
may not share this view.
One reaches similar results upon considering Green's analysis of
the family law practice of Faith, a lawyer who holds, among other
views, "that the religious principle that children should honor their
parents means that children of divorced parents should spend time
with the non-custodial parent whether they like it or not. ' 70 It
would be troubling to impose such a precise maxim on an unsus-
pecting client. As Justice Cardozo observed, a judge who believed
theater going was a sin "would err if he attempted to impose upon
the community as a rule of life his own idiosyncrasies .... My own
notion is that he would be under a duty to conform to the accepted
standards of the community, the mor6s of the times. '71
Richard Matasar described "the pain of moral lawyering" when
a lawyer's personal moral code conflicts with the client's goals.
When faced with the awful conflict between ignoring the client's
needs, or the lawyer's own need to salve his conscience, Matasar
concludes that the lawyer should concede to the wisdom of the pro-
68. See Matasar, supra note 67, at 981 ("Do what the profession demands. That is
the price of being a lawyer, and that is the end of the story."). For descriptions of, but
not support for, this view, see, e.g., Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the
Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 438 (1985)
(discussing notion that the possibility of a broader influential and independent coun-
selor role in large law firms is "not a proper normative ideal, either because what is
'right' is too ambiguous, or because the lawyer has no expertise in or responsibility for
business judgments"); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 621 (discussing
the notion "[b]y what right should lawyers 'play God' or 'impose their own views
about the path of virtue upon their clients"').
69. Green, supra note 58, at 49.
70. Id. at 36.
71. Id. at 33-4.
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fession. "Do what the profession demands. That is the price of
being a lawyer and that is the end of the story. "72
Unless individuals are 'true believers,' they probably carry
doubts about many values that conflict with those of the profes-
sion. Those who are willing to acknowledge that their values are
contingent, or are not shared by others who in fact might have it
right, may well be able to adjust to professional norms ....
Those who maintain deep humility about their values may be
best able to cope with gaps between personal values and profes-
sional demands.73
I would like to discuss three aspects of this analysis and chal-
lenge a few of the underlying premises. First, the extent to which it
relies on an interpretation of the Establishment Clause as cultural
guide for "walling off" religion from public life. Second, the extent
to which it relies on a perception of "religious lawyering" as an
attempt to impose particular practices or maxims on others who do
not share those particular beliefs. Third, the extent to which it
presumes there is always a danger that the lawyer will "impose"
her beliefs on the client.
1. Madison's Advice: "Keep the Ministry Obliquely in View"
One of the pillars supporting the analysis is the proposition that
the "wall of separation"74 erected by the Establishment Clause not
only mandates the institutional separation of church and state, but
also translates into a cultural guide, essentially "walling off" reli-
gion from public life. Thoughtful and thorough scholarship indi-
cates that the historical support for this cultural application may be
pretty slim.
Legal historian Mark DeWolfe Howe observed that more than a
century before Thomas Jefferson used the "wall of separation"
phrase, Roger Williams, champion of religious liberty and freedom
of conscience, used the same metaphor, with an opposite effect.
Williams imagined a "wall of separation" out of concern for "the
dread of worldly corruptions which might consume the churches" if
"a wall of separation did not stand between them and the state. '7 5
Howe surmised: "If the First Amendment codified a figure of
72. Matasar, supra note 67, at 981.
73. Id. at 983.
74. Thomas Jefferson is commonly credited for coining the phrase. See Letter of
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (visited March 15, 1999) <http://
www.danbury.lib.ct.us/org/religion/letter/eff.html>.
75. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965).
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speech it embraced the believing affirmations of Roger Williams
and his heirs no less firmly than it did the questioning doubts of
Thomas Jefferson and the Enlightenment. ' 76 Studying the texts
that served as the basis for the development of the religion clauses,
Daniel Dreisbach also concluded that the purpose of the wall was
"to foster an environment in which religious freedom could flour-
ish"; the wall was "only useful insofar as it advanced the end of
religious freedom. 77
The history of the founding is replete with examples of the ex-
tent to which the founders regarded religion and morality as "indis-
pensable supports" to the public life of the newly born nation.7 s
Particularly interesting are indications of the extent to which the
founders, many of them lawyers themselves, kept religion as a
point of reference in their own professional lives. James Madison,
for example, advising his young friend William Bradford on his
"choice of callings," expressed his disappointment that Bradford
had decided not to go into the ministry. Madison advised him: "al-
ways keep the Ministry obliquely in View whatever your profession
be. This will lead you to cultivate an acquaintance occasionally
with the most sublime of all Sciences and will qualify you for a
change of public character if you should hereafter desire it."79
Bradford went on to become the first Attorney General of the
United States.
These texts at least raise questions about the strength of histori-
cal support for an interpretation of the Establishment Clause as a
76. Id. at 9.
77. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision
of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-
State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 209-10 (1990).
78. See, e.g., George Washington's Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796) (published in
The Independent Chronicle, September 26, 1796) (last updated Feb. 27, 1998) <http://
www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/farewell/text.html> ("Of all the dis-
positions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are in-
dispensable supports . . . [a]nd let us with caution indulge the supposition, that
morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influ-
ence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both
forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious princi-
ple."); MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION
IN AMERICA 154-66 (1984) (discussing the development of "public religion," the duty
of which Benjamin Franklin viewed as to produce a common morality). This is not to
argue that the Founders' concept of public religion best expresses or exhausts the
contribution that religion can and should bring to public life. Rather it is to make the
narrow point that for the Founders it would have been inconceivable to relegate reli-
gion to a completely distinct and private sphere.,
79. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EX-
PERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 65-6 (1998).
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cultural guide for "walling off" religion from public life. Particu-
larly suspect are sweeping statements such as "[t]he Constitution
decrees that religion must be a private matter .... "80 As such, we
should also question the extent to which interpretations of the Es-
tablishment Clause may support a cultural tendency to relegate
religion to a "private" and out of the way sphere.
A legitimate question could be: "So what? The Founders could
not have anticipated the kind of society in which we live today. We
separate religion from the workplace because it is a good idea."
The next section thus focuses on the substantive nature of religious
lawyers' contributions to the public discourse and to the
profession.
2. A Suggested Focus for Religious Lawyering Discussions
Discussions of religious lawyers' dilemmas are often framed in
terms of a lawyer's attempt to bring to bear a very specific practice
or maxim in counseling a client who does not share the lawyer's
beliefs. There is "something troubling" about encouraging or al-
lowing this. Working with Green's examples, take Upright's "per-
sonal moral and religious view that it is improper to 'snitch' on
friends, family, colleagues and others with whom one has a rela-
tionship."81 If "do not snitch on friends" is Upright's highest value
in life, this could indeed bring him and his client into dangerous
territory. It seems that Upright would have no moral qualms about
facilitating organized crime. But to the extent that he does not
have a certain hierarchy of moral principles, or a sense of complex-
ity in their application to various circumstances, e.g., "do not facili-
tate stealing" trumps "do not snitch on friends," Upright would be
an unusual person, and should be analyzed as such.
Similarly, consider Faith's belief that "the religious principle that
children should honor their parents means that children of di-
vorced parents should spend time with the non-custodial parent
whether they like it or not." 2 Of course there would be something
troubling about the rigid application of such a maxim. Most re-
sponsible family law lawyers, including religious lawyers, would be
concerned about any custody decision that does not consider all of
the circumstances that might affect the physical and psychological
well being of the children. To the extent that Faith does not ac-
80. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
81. Green, supra note 58, at 49.
82. Id. at 36.
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knowledge the need for such complex considerations, she would be
unusual, and should be analyzed as such.
There is definitely something troubling about allowing anyone to
rigidly impose "highly particular" and "far from universal" maxims
on those who do not share those beliefs. s3 Indeed, the strongest
case for making a recommendation based on values that the client
does not share occurs when the lawyer's values coincide with pro-
fessional values or common societal values.84
But there are several dangers to keeping discussions of religious
lawyering focused on these kinds of examples. First, they could
portray a caricature of religious lawyers as immature and insensi-
tive, lacking a basic sense of moral complexity, and awkward and
bumbling in the course of their interactions in a pluralistic society.
Occasionally, religious lawyers are even portrayed as irrational and
anti-social. As a reflection of society, the legal profession undoubt-
edly has its share of immature and irrational practitioners. But it is
unfair to include these characteristics in the portrait of the typical
religious lawyer.
A second danger is that these kinds of examples serve as a con-
venient but less than sturdy prop to a sweeping assertion: the nor-
mative value of the religious lawyer's contribution to public
discourse should be measured by whether the values at issue are
"shared by others." Where a belief is not "commonly held," a law-
yer is required to conform to the mor6s of the times.
While this analysis may work for attempts to impose "highly par-
ticular" practices and maxims, it does not necessarily follow that
whether a belief is "commonly held" should serve as the measure
in all cases. There may be times when a client's goal is technically
legal, but it collides with a lawyer's basic moral and religious vision
of the common good: "taking rights seriously" versus "taking the
community seriously." For example, a lawyer represents a retail
clothing chain that is negotiating a contract with a foreign manu-
facturer that employs twelve-year-old children who are paid five
cents an hour. The poverty in the area of the factory is extreme.
May the lawyer bring to bear her visions of the common good in
advising the client about the terms of the contract?8 5
83. See id. at 40.
84. See id. at 45.
85. See F. Giba-Matthews, A Catholic Lawyer and the Church's Social Teaching,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1541, 1549 (1998) (analyzing this issue according to an applica-
tion of Catholic social doctrine). This hypothetical is analyzed infra at p. 1230-31.
Other examples where a client's goals may be technically legal but anti-social or im-
moral would include client's resistance of safety regulations. See Gordon, supra note
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Particularly in the big business and large firm context, one could
argue that there is a certain "shared belief" among clients and law-
yers that considerations of the common good should not come into
play. The prevailing interpretation of professional ethics advises
that the common good be served by fidelity to the client's interests,
as the client perceives them. Based on religiously grounded reflec-
tion, a lawyer may conclude that is not good enough. Here the
lawyer should at least be allowed space to bring into the discussion
ethical and moral considerations. It is precisely here where reli-
gious lawyers may bring to the practice a vision that provides a
much-needed alternative to predominantly individualistic cultural
tendencies.86
In some situations, there will be serious debates about whether a
lawyer is bringing to bear an alternative all-embracing objective vi-
sion of the common good, or whether the lawyer is simply trying to
impose on others a highly specific application of personal religious
views. The abortion debate leaps to mind. Some aspects of di-
vorce and other family matters may also fall into this category. De-
pending on the place a particular practice holds in an individual's
scale of beliefs and values, there will be sticky issues about defini-
tions of comprehensive visions and the conflict this may generate.
For example, the cases in which Jehovah's Witness parents have
47, at 264-65. Similar but probably easier issues also arise when a client counts on a
regulatory agency's limited enforcement budget in deciding whether to comply with
environmental, safety, or tax regulations. See Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 21, at
1024.
86. See Rhode, Professionalism Problem, supra note 18, at 321 ("Some conduct
that is inconsistent with social interests remains legal either because prohibitions are
too difficult or costly to enforce, or because policymakers lack sufficient information
or independence from special interests. That clients have a legal right to pursue a
certain objective does not mean that they have a moral right to do so, or that justice
necessarily will be served by their zealous representation. Rather, one of a lawyer's
most socially valued functions is to counsel clients about the full range of ethical con-
siderations that bear on particular decisions and to withhold assistance in matters that
run counter to the lawyer's own sense of social responsibility."); see also discussion
infra at p. 1094-97; Panel Discussion: Does Religious Faith Interfere with a Lawyer's
Work? 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 985 (Remarks of Stephen Carter: "[w]hen we think of
the consumerism of our age, I think particularly about the pervasive ethic of our time,
the ethic of 'I ought to be able to get what I want and you ought not to be able to stop
me'.... Lawyers are in the client service business, and so many lawyers conceptualize
the role as 'my goal is to help the client get what the client wants."'); WEEKEND
EDITION-SUNDAY (Nat'l Public Radio Coverage, Jan. 10, 1999), available in 1999 WL
5731947 (Carter stated: "[A Christian lawyer cannot give fealty to such an idea]... if
what my client wants is wrong in the eyes of my faith, it's quite unclear how I can
justify helping my client go out and get it.").
1090
BIG FIRM LITIGATOR
refused to consent to their minor children receiving a life-saving
blood transfusions are particularly difficult.
Such discussions are interesting and important because in many
ways they reflect the tensions in the effort to define our culture.
But we should be careful that they do not completely take over the
conversation or become so contentious that they freeze the rest of
the discussion about the common good. Most lawyers do not deal
with these particular issues in their day to day practice; from a
practical standpoint, these scenarios are marginal. We can, and we
should, be talking about money, the environment, power, poverty,
product safety, worker safety and government regulations; the list
is endless. In each of these areas, religious visions of the common
good express important ideals and applications; lawyers rooted in
such visions have much to contribute to the public discourse. And
we may be surprised to discover a vast common terrain that could
serve as a basis for more productive discussions in the areas of cur-
rently intense conflict.
Shifting the focus of religious lawyering discussions away from
analysis of the problem of rigidly imposing precise maxims on cli-
ents toward analysis of more common 'and more realistic dilemmas
will be helpful in two ways. It will present a fairer and more realis-
tic portrait of religious lawyers, and it will help to articulate the
substantive contribution that religious lawyers can bring to the
public discourse and to the practice of law.
3. The "Client-Centered" Approach in Context
A third premise of the cultural analysis is the presumption of a
danger that the lawyer will "impose" her values on the client. "Cli-
ent-centered" counseling contemplates that decisions should gen-
erally be left to clients.87 A legal ethics textbook explains,
"Because client autonomy is of paramount importance, decisions
should be made on the basis of what choice is most likely to pro-
vide a client with maximum satisfaction. ''8  A lawyer should wait
for an explicit invitation from the client before bringing moral non-
legal considerations to bear on the decision-making process, and
the lawyer's opinion should be tailored to the client's subjective
values: "though you may ultimately provide a client who asks for it
87. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 66, at 279 ("Client-centered counseling places
maximum values on client decision-making.").
88. See id. at 261 (emphasis in text omitted) ("Our society highly values each indi-
vidual's right of self-determination, and you ought to abandon that value only in the
face of strong reason for doing so.").
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with your opinion, you should do so only after you have counseled
a client thoroughly enough that you can base your opinion on the
client's subjective values, not on your own."'89 When a client makes
a decision based on value preferences which conflict with the law-
yer's, "unless a client's decision violates the law or is clearly im-
moral, principles of client autonomy suggest the client values
prevail." 90
This dynamic may be appropriate in the context of an individual
attorney-client relationship where the lawyer is counseling an espe-
cially vulnerable client. The attorney must be sensitive to ways in
which she may "dominate" the relationship to the detriment of
open and effective communication and problem solving. However,
problems arise when this theory is applied to the dynamics of large
firm representation of big businesses.
First, in the relationship between a corporate client and its
outside counsel, it may be the client who dominates the relation-
ship or manipulates the lawyer.91 Concerns about the lawyer "im-
posing" personal values may be out of context. In many instances,
client domination is so pervasive that it is unrealistic to think that a
lawyer, particularly an associate, could even speak to the client
about such issues. In fact, the associate may not deal with the cli-
ent at all. In these circumstances the balance of power is such that
the discussion of personal or religious values should probably be
framed as an analogue of "free exercise" or "freedom of expres-
sion" rather than a concern about the danger of "imposing" one's
views on others.
Second, in the context of legal services to big business, it is ques-
tionable whether the ultimate criterion for decisions should always
be "what choice is most likely to provide a client with maximum
satisfaction," 92 especially if the client measures "maximum satisfac-
tion" as short-term gain. Stephen Ellman critiqued a client-cen-
tered approach to individual counseling that fails to bring to the
forefront moral and political concerns: "[M]uch more is at stake in
any case than one side's gain or loss. The acts that serve a client's
self interest may take unfair advantage of other people or cause
them more damage than they deserve to suffer. If the lawyer does
not also ask the client about moral or political consequences, she
89. Id. at 279.
90. Id. at 282.
91. Allegretti, supra note 3, at 1112 ("[In the lawyer-client relationship, domina-
tion is not a one-way street.").
92. BINDER ET AL., supra note 66, at 261.
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may implicitly exclude these effects on others from the counseling
process. ' 93 In the context of legal representation of large busi-
nesses, given the proportion of power and resources concentrated
in large corporate entities, the critique of counseling that fails to
consider the impact of decisions on other people and on the larger
community is even more compelling.
It goes without saying that not everyone would embrace whole-
heartedly this vision of "being a person who is a lawyer." It could
make people uncomfortable and it could even cost firms some
money or some clients. However, there should be room for this
vision because it is neither unprofessional nor at odds with the
practice of law in a pluralistic culture. Lawyers with a vision of the
common good grounded in religious reflection bring a specific and
positive contribution to the life of the community, and to the pro-
fession as a whole. As Howard Lesnick explained, "A polity that
encourages its citizens to bring to bear their own serious moral re-
flections on the morally significant decisions they face will be more
likely to grow in justice and humanity. 94
IV. On Being a Person Who is a Lawyer at a Big Firm
What does the "pain" of moral lawyering look like in big firm
practice? It is premised on the perception that there is an irresolv-
able conflict between what the client wants and a lawyer's personal
need to salve his or her conscience. If the lawyer follows his or her
conscience, the client may be "harmed." Because there is no ra-
tionale for "imposing" personal beliefs on a client, the lawyer
should do what the profession demands: serve the client's needs, as
the client sees them.95 Particularly when advising publicly traded
corporations, this sense of irresolvable conflict is often linked to a
93. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 748-49 (1987);
see also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1125 (1988) ("The appeal to individual autonomy or right is not a sufficient basis for
client loyalty because it begs the question of why the client's autonomy or right
should be preferred to that of the person whose autonomy or right is frustrated by the
client's activities.").
94. Lesnick, supra note 43, at 1489 ("Far from needing to be 'bleached out' by the
norms of professionalism, a lawyer's desire to guide his or her actions by [common
religious qualities] - should be presumptively welcomed as socially desirable charac-
teristics, which enhance both the inherent quality and the likely consequences of in-
teractions that lawyer's have with clients, third parties, and the legal system."); see
also Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1267 ("A profession - especially a troubled one - should
encourage discussion about comprehensive doctrines and their impact on the
profession.").
95. See Matasar, supra note 67, at 981.
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presumption that corporate activity is "amoral" - because a cor-
poration's sole purpose is to make money, it is impermissible for it
to take into consideration other factors, such as concern for the
common good. When a presumption of client autonomy links to-
gether with a presumption that corporations exist solely to make
money, they form a vicious and unbreakable circle: "Clients can
justify asocial action on the ground that counsel have pronounced
it not unlawful, while counsel can rationalize their participation by
deferring to client autonomy. "96
In contrast, what might the "joy" of moral lawyering look like in
big firm practice? Its foundation is the must that highlights the
may in legal ethics. Moved by an obligation to bring to bear on
one's legal work considerations of the common good, a religious
lawyer searches out, highlights, and acts on the opportunities to
refer to relevant ethical and moral considerations. Moral lawyer-
ing presupposes that what is at stake is not just the lawyer's own
"highly particular" beliefs or a personal "need" to ease one's con-
science, but a broader and more objective vision of the common
good.
In the corporate context, however, particularly in the representa-
tion of publicly traded entities, this is not enough. Ethical and
moral considerations may also have to be "sold" to the client -
and not only to the individual corporate representative to whom
outside counsel refers, but also to the corporate entity as a whole.
Even if a particular corporate representative would like to bring
concern for the common good to bear on decisions, she may con-
sider her hands tied by the corporation's fiduciary duty to its share-
holders to maximize profits.
Thus the specific contribution of a religious lawyer in the big
firm context may consist in this: a must that highlights the may, not
only in legal ethics, but also in principles of corporate governance.
Moved by an obligation to bring concern for the common good to
bear on one's work for a corporate client, a religious lawyer
searches out and highlights all of the ways in which a corporate
entity may bring concern for the common good to bear on its
decisions.
Here too, the may is already on the books. For example, the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Sec-
tion 2.01(b)(2) provides: "Even if corporate profit and shareholder
gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of
96. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 625.
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its business: [m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are
reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business. '97 It should be noted that the text refers to "the conduct
of its business," not simply philanthropy on the fringes. 98 The com-
ment notes: "Corporate officials are not less morally obliged than
any other citizens to take ethical considerations into account [in
making decisions], and it would be unwise social policy to preclude
them from doing so." 99 Legally, principles such as these leave
plenty of room for ethical and moral considerations.
When concern for the common good must be "sold" to the cor-
porate client, it is also useful to consider the extent to which social
responsibility coincides with long-term profit maximization. In
counseling and advising corporate clients, the lawyer asks a deep
and often complex question: if what the client would like to do is
really so contrary to the common good, can it possibly be in the
ultimate, true, long-term best interests of the client? If "good" and
"harm" are measured beyond the scale of quarterly profits, can it
really be that the morally "right" thing to do "harms" the client?
The joy of moral lawyering is to discover the extent to which and
the ways in which there is "no ultimate split" between a corpora-
tion's self interest and the greater public good.'
This analysis will be strengthened by an understanding of corpo-
rate entities as "social beings."101 While corporations may be
profit driven, they do not generate profit in a vacuum. Business
entities function and generate profits in the context of a series of
97. ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b)(2) (1994) [hereinaf-
ter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
98. In fact, corporate philanthropy is treated in a separate provision. See id.
§ 2.01(b)(3) (1994) (The corporation "[m]ay devote a reasonable amount of resources
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.").
99. Id. § 2.01 cmt. (h) (1994).
100. See Robert' C. Solomon, Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelean
Approach to Business Ethics, 2 Bus. ETHICS QUARTERLY 317, 322 (1992) ("What is
best in us,- our virtues - are in turn defined by [the] larger community, and there is
therefore no ultimate split of antagonism between individual self-interest and thegreater public good."); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 623 ("Particu-
larly where clients' true 'interests' are not self-evident, one of the lawyers' greatest
potential contributions lies in persuading individuals to act in conformity with their
most socially enlightened instinct.").
101. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Share-
holder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, The Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, The
Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 1, 19 (1988) (discussing rationale for devoting resources to philanthropic pur-
poses: "[t]he corporation is a social actor. It benefits from the social climate. It is
now widely accepted that the corporation should at least consider the social impact of
its activities, so as to be aware of the social costs those activities entail").
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relationships-internally, with employees, directors and stockhold-
ers; and externally, with consumers and the public at large.10 2 In
fact, a number of state statutes explicitly authorize corporate
boards to take into account the impact of corporate decisions on
constituencies other than the shareholders.1 0 3
102. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, § 2.01 cmt.
(f) (1994) ("The modern corporation by its nature creates interdependencies with a
variety of groups with whom the corporation has legitimate concerns, such as employ-
ees, customers, suppliers, and members of the communities in which the corporation
operates. The long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on meet-
ing the fair expectations of such groups."); id. § 2.01 cmt. (h) ("The ethical considera-
tions reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of the business
necessarily include ethical responsibilities that may be owed to persons other than
shareholders with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees,
customers, suppliers, and members of the communities within which the corporation
operates."); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: Cooperation and In-
tegrity in Business 146 (1992) ("To think of the corporation as a community is to insist
that it cannot be, no matter how vicious its internal politics, a mere collection of self-
interested individuals. To see business as a social activity is to see it as a practice that
both thrives on competition and presupposes a coherent community of mutually con-
cerned as well as self-interested citizens."); see also JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS AN.
NUS (The Hundredth Year) n.35 (1991) ("The church acknowledges the legitimate
role of profit as an indication that a business is functioning well. When a firm makes a
profit, this means that productivity factors have been properly employed and corre-
sponding human needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not the only indi-
cator of a firm's condition. It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order and
yet for the people, who make up the firm's most valuable asset, to be humiliated and
their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, this will eventually have
negative repercussions on the firm's economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a
business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as
a community of persons who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic
needs and who form a particular group at the service of the whole society."). For
description of an international project in which actual businesses are premised on a
concept of the business person "in mutual relationship" with others within the busi-
ness and in the community, see Economy of Communion, also known as Economy of
Sharing (visited March 16, 1999) <http://www.focolare.org/en/peco.html> (noting that
750 large and small businesses share profits with those in need and place the person at
the center of business operations).
103. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805 § 5/8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) ("In dis-
charging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees of
the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in considering the best
long term and short term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any ac-
tion (including without limitation, action which may involve or relate to a change or
potential change in control of the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and cus-
tomers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors."); see
also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, § 2.01 Reporter's
Notes n.8 (1994) (discussing "other constituencies" statutes); Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253,
2258-63 (1990) (listing states which have recently adopted "other constituencies" stat-
utes; also discussing Delaware cases which allow directors to consider the interests of
others, so long as there is some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of
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"Amoral" views of business, particularly the perception that
making money is the only and ultimate achievement, contradict
common business experience, in which corporate decisions are
based on the fact that profit is only one indication of a healthy
business. Sophisticated business planning and legal counseling rec-
ognize that the health of a business is much more complex than
raw profit margins. 10 4
Businesses must, and do, consider the impact of their decisions
on each of the relationships on which they depend: whether inter-
nally, in the form of employee relations, safety and morale; or ex-
ternally, in the form of customer relations, product quality and
relations with the public and the government. A common quip is
that such decisions are anything but altruistic; these factors are
taken into consideration only to avoid bad publicity, government
fines and pesky products liability suits - all in function of the bot-
tom line. But whatever the motive and whatever the label (public
relations, loss prevention, etc.), such decisions reflect the essence
of the nature of a corporate entity as a social being that relies on a
network of social relationships for its life, health and growth.
A lawyer with an eye to the common good can begin to see the
function of the law in a different light. One vision of the law is as a
system of annoying but usually necessary limits to individual and
corporate autonomy so that pursuit of power and profit may not be
so unrestrained as to expose others to detriment. A lawyer with an
eye to the common good can begin to form a different vision: the
law itself is an expression of our relationships in a community. 05
the shareholders). While these statutes were enacted as an anti-takeover device, the
application would seem to be "without limitation" to this context.
104. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at § 2.01
cmt. (f) (1994) ("Short-term profits may properly be subordinated to recognition that
responsible maintenance of [interdependencies on various relationships] is likely to
contribute to long-term corporate profit and shareholder gain. The corporation's
business may be conducted accordingly."); Solomon, supra note 102, at 19 ("The mak-
ing of money pure and simple is not the culmination of business life."); CENTESIMUS
ANNUS, supra note 102 (profitability is not the only indicator of a firm's condition);
see also Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, No More Quandaries: A Look at Virtue Through the
Eyes of Robert Solomon, 34 AM. Bus. L. J. 117, 126 (1996) (arguing that the most
damaging aspect of "amoral" views of business is the perception that making money is
the ultimate achievement).
105. For these insights, I am indebted to Maria Voce, an Italian lawyer who is stud-
ying the relationship between the person, the community and the law. See Maria
Voce (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also LUBAN, supra
note 22, at 31 ("[F]air laws are a community's effort to realize its purposes, arrived
through accepted political processes. Out of solidarity with your fellows, without
which no community can exist, you ought to go along with generally beneficial laws.
To disobey or manipulate such laws for your own benefit - say, by hiring an instru-
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Just as the essence of my nature as a person is to have as my chief
end the common good, to work to maintain the community, the
essential nature of a corporate entity, its "truest" good, unfolds in
relationships of mutual respect and cooperation with the commu-
nity - in the internal relationships with employees, managers, di-
rectors and shareholders; and in the external relationships with
consumers and the public. °6 A lawyer with an eye to the common
good works to understand the ways in which the law expresses the
nature of these relationships, and how it applies to business deci-
sions, for the ultimate good of the business entity.
This image is painted in broad strokes. Any discussion of its ap-
plication would start with a flurry of questions and comments
about institutional competence. Nonetheless, it can function as a
springboard for moving beyond the perception that the client is
"harmed" by an effort to consider the common good.
How might these principles come into play? And what about
when a corporate representative is not convinced there is "no ulti-
mate split" between it's own self-interest and a broader vision of
the public good? Take the hypothetical discussed in the previous
section. 10 7 Lawyer Lana represents a retail clothing chain that is
negotiating a contract with a foreign manufacturer that employs
twelve-year-old children who are paid five cents an hour. The pov-
erty in the area surrounding the factory is extreme. There are cur-
rently no legal restrictions on the import of clothing manufactured
by child labor. May Lana bring to bear her visions of the common
good in advising the client about the terms of the contract?
Moved by an obligation to bring considerations of the common
good to bear on her legal work, Lana seeks out the extent to which
the corporation may take ethical and moral principles into consid-
eration without violating the duty to the shareholders to maximize
mentalist lawyer to find loopholes in the law - insults that solidarity ,and is disre-
spectful of your fellow citizens and their collective purposes.").
106. See Kagan & Rosen, supra note 68, at 438-39 ("Corporate managers, operating
under time pressure and intra-corporate rivalries, sometimes fail to consider the full
economic and moral implications of their decisions. Sometimes they miscalculate the
risks entailed in corporate action or inaction, misperceive the motives or the justice-
claims of actual or potential adversaries. In such cases, lawyers might speak for the
'true' economic interests of the corporation, as against the perceptions of particular
managers. Moreover, because corporate systems for ensuring compliance with regu-
latory and liability laws are always vulnerable to slippage and erosion, opportunities
exists for lawyers to take the initiative in devising and lobbying for programs to bol-
ster existing corporate safety, environmental protection, and antifraud
mechanisms.").
107. See discussion supra at p.1089.
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profits. Her job here is difficult because she does not have a clear
legal hook, such as import restrictions, on which to hang her hat.
The corporate entity would have been more amenable to consider-
ing clear-cut legal restrictions. While there are not yet definite re-
strictions and liabilities, she has heard rumblings of a class-action
suit against various manufacturers on behalf of the foreign work-
ers,10 8 and of the near-future possibility of government restrictions
and regulation. Lana informs the client of these risks. Because she
is a good lawyer who is attentive to the whole gamut of legal risks,
she would have advised the client of these possibilities regardless
of her concern for the common good.
The client seems willing to risk a potential class action, and pro-
poses a clause to renegotiate the contract in the event of significant
changes in import regulations. Lana does not stop here. She is
aware that other clothing manufacturers have received significant
positive press for agreeing to monitor and enforce child labor stan-
dards in the foreign factories with which they have contracts.10 9
Lana highlights this as an example of how it could be in the manu-
facturer's "enlightened self-interest" to agree to a similar compli-
ance program. The manufacturer seems somewhat interested, but
not yet moved.
At this point, how far can Lana push the ethical and moral con-
siderations? This is the hard question. The dynamic will depend a
great deal on the relationship she has with the client's representa-
tive, her status in her own firm and the client's representative's sta-
tus within the corporate entity. If both Lana and the client's
representative are relatively powerful within their own organiza-
tions, there would be much more potential for a frank and open
conversation along the lines of Elihu Root's advice: "The law lets
you do it, but don't .... It's a rotten thing to do.""' If the client
still wants to-go ahead with no consideration of the problems of
child labor,' and if Lana's conscience is not satisfied with having
raised the issue and having attempted to convince the client, she
108. See William Branigin, Top Clothing Retailers Labeled Labor Abusers; Sweat-
shops Allegedly Run on US. Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at A14 (reporting
class actions filed on behalf of foreign garment workers).
109. See Lisa Brennan, Rights Committee Gets Results, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1999, at
B7.
110. RALPH NADER & WESLEY SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND
THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA XVi (1996) (quoting Elihu Root, as attrib-
uted by Archibald Cox).
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may consider withdrawing rather than lending her legal services to
the implementation of the client's goals."'
The problem is by no means simple - there is a real conflict;
both the religious lawyer and the corporate client face tough deci-
sions. But it is important to note that the decisions are driven
neither by the lawyer's rules of professional ethics nor by the cli-
ent's principles of corporate governance. Neither set of rules
stands in the way of bringing considerations of the common good
to bear on the decision-making process. Instead, a real barrier to
such considerations may be the institutional structures of large
businesses and large law firms.
There are several very practical obstacles to deliberating with
corporate clients about the way in which their business decisions
may impact the common good. Because of the structure of large
corporations, often by the time outside law firms are consulted, ba-
sic decisions about corporate objectives have already been made.11 2
Large businesses typically do not perceive outside counsel as an aid
to deliberation about goals, but rather as a tool for implementation
of already set goals." 3 Thus, the relationship between corporate
111. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(b)(3) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if: a client insists on pursuing an objective that the lawyer consid-
ers repugnant or imprudent).
112. Gordon, supra note 47, at 277 ("Corporations notoriously draw sharp organi-
zational boundaries between themselves and outsiders, reinforced by blood-bonds of
loyalty that produce tremendous stress and dissonance in employees trying to play the
double-agent's game of serving both the social norms of their professions and com-
pany policies."); Kagan & Rosen, supra note 68, at 427 (discussing hypothesis that
lawyers act as independent and influential counselors: "In dealing with larger corpo-
rate clients who have an intelligent and competent management team, I am often
faced with decisions which have already been made and asked to support them with
legal authority or to make suggestions for minor modifications to meet the require-
ments of existing law"); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and
the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 298 (1985) (describing the role of a corpo-
ration's general counsel, which narrows the function of outside firms: "The law firm
tends to become an executor of the general counsel's instructions, with decreasing
scope for originality or independent judgement").
113. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 276 (Many large companies "have become more
discriminating consumers of outside legal services - more inclined to shop around
and to compare the costs and benefits of contracting such work out before deciding
which (if any) outside firm to hire."); Kagan & Rosen, supra note 68, at 429 ("Grow-
ing sophistication among clients has tended to relegate professionals to narrower and
more technical roles .... Large firms lawyers ... seem to have willingly adopted a
professional ideology that suggests that the lawyer should not be independently influ-
ential, but rather a technically adept specialist who tells the corporate manager, 'here
are the legal risks, you make the decision."'); id. at 433 (discussing one attorney's
sense that "even the lawyers in firms which can ... be seen as being quite powerful
are generally powerful because they choose to serve (in a relatively efficient and pow-
erful manner) forces which are themselves socially and economically powerful");
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clients and outside firms is such that it gives "clients little reason to
ask for the lawyers' deliberative advice, and the lawyers themselves
limited experience in providing it. 11 4 Kronman describes the ways
in which "[1]arge firms have made a conscious effort 'to cultivate
the specialized skills base' needed to attract corporate clients.., by
encouraging their lawyers to acquire greater expertise in narrower
fields" and "by developing . . . 'a set of structured relationships
between specialists in different fields and with different client ba-
ses-coordinated teams that permit these firms to offer their cor-
porate clients a wider range of increasingly specialized
services.""'1 5 Thus, lawyers may have the sense that issues of social
significance rarely come up. 116 Or, if they do come up, they may
not see them.117
The icing on the cake is the internal structure of large law firms.
If a lawyer has the sense that a client's goals are repugnant to the
Rhode, Professionalism Problem, supra note 18, at 298-99 ("Corporate clients today
appear more likely to shop for representation on particular matters, rather than to
build long-term relationships with firms that supply representation for most needs.
As private practice becomes more competitive, specialized, and transactional, lawyers
face intense pressures to satisfy clients' short term desires at the expense of other
values. Without a stable relationship of trust and confidence, it is risky for counsel to
protest unreasonable demands or to deliver an unwelcome message about what legal
rules or legal ethics require."); KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 277 (noting a shift from
"comprehensive and enduring retainer relationships towards less exclusive and more
task-specific ad hoc engagements"); id. at 288 ("[T]he more the relationship approxi-
mates a one-time encounter between strangers, the more difficult it becomes for a
lawyer to provide deliberative assistance ... in a dependable way ... [t]he more the
lawyer's help is likely to be of an exclusively instrumental sort") For the flip side of
this argument, see Gordon, supra note 47, at 287 ("[C]ompanies now less often retain
the same firm to represent all their interests than they did fifteen years ago, and more
often spread legal business, discrete deals or lawsuits among several firms. A law firm
thus has less to lose if one of its lawyers risks offending a client by the advice she gives
of public positions she supports.").
114. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 290.
115. Id. at 275-76. See also Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice and Professional
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 503, 537 (1985) ("The vast majority of tasks that lawyers in these firms perform
turn on technical matters involving parties of roughly equal status and resources ....
The social questions of our time simply do not come up frequently in large-firm
practice.").
116. Nelson, supra note 115, at 538 ("The notion that lawyers struggle with clients
over fundamental questions about the common good is simply wrong. Occasionally
they will be faced by the dishonest or crooked client, and I do not mean to suggest
that this presents trivial problems. But in general, large firm lawyers strive to maxi-
mize the substantive interests of their clients within the boundaries of legal ethics.").
117. See KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 288-89 (As large firm practice becomes more
transactional and specialized, "[o]ne important consequence is the decrease in the
ability of any single lawyer to see a client's problem as a whole and to address all the
issues it presents.").
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common good, the ultimate power is to be able to show this client
to the door.118 Most lawyers in large law firms, even junior part-
ners, hardly ever have that power in their hands.
If a lawyer lacks power, of what use is a vision of the common
good? Even if for structural reasons it may not become a part of
direct conversations with clients, it can inform internal discussions
with colleagues about proposals, strategies for negotiation and
drafting. For some, it is useful to keep the vision alive for the fu-
ture, which may bring more substantial contact with the client or
an in-house role involving developing policy or insuring
compliance. 119
Recruiting is another sensitive spot where a vision of the com-
mon good can impact a law firm's decisions whether or not to rep-
resent certain clients. For example, some surmise that what
prompted Covington & Burling to withdraw from representing the
government-owned South African Airways was pressure from the
elite law students it was trying to recruit.12° Law students should
not underestimate the impact they can have on these kind of
decisions.
V. On Being a Person Who is a Lawyer at a Big Firm
Doing Litigation
Litigation poses particular problems, because in a certain sense
"an advocate begins his work only after his client's objectives have
been set.' 1 21 It seems there is very little room for deliberation
about the common good: "[A]n advocate is the representative of a
particular interest in actual or potential conflict with others, and it
118. See Carter, supra note 12, at 930 ("For religious lawyers, the freedom to follow
God even into the practice of the profession is of first importance, and clients who do
not like it are free to shop for legal services elsewhere.").
119. See KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 309-11 ("[L]awyers working in house are more
likely to have a relationship that involves them in the client's day-to-day affairs and
therefore gives them the contextual knowledge on which real deliberative counseling
depends." However, in-house counsel's independent judgment may be more strained:
"the fewer the clients on whom a lawyer must depend for his livelihood, the greater
the pressure on him will be, in any given case, to conform his opinions to those of his
client despite the fact that his professional judgment recommends another view.").
120. Discussed in Simon, supra note 93, at 1130 n.99 (citing Morgan, Bad for Law-
yers, Bad for Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at A35).
121. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 146. See Nelson, supra note 115, at 532 ("Litiga-
tion presents practitioners with fewer opportunities for giving nonlegal advice ... the
reason is that litigation associates have little contact with clients, and by the time a
case is in litigation, it is too late to give nonlegal advice.").
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is not his duty to define the collective well-being of those involved
or to determine how it can be achieved.
122
As Kronman explained, this is an overstatement. Advocacy also
includes representing clients in the context of private negotiations.
In this context, in order to persuade the parties to agree, the lawyer
must identify the opportunities for improving the welfare not only
of her own client, but also the welfare of the other party. 123 But if
settlement and negotiation are out of the picture, is there any room
for a litigator to bring to bear considerations of the common good?
Just as corporations generate profits not in a vacuum, but in the
context of a set of relationships, advocacy is also not in a vacuum.
As Kronman described, "[a] lawyer arguing before a judge who is
responsible for maintaining the well-being of the law must himself
become a master of analysis from the judicial point of view, for
otherwise he will not know what to say to advance his client's
cause."' 124 The most effective advocacy will be able to empathize
with the judicial perspective of the good of society and the internal
development of the law. "[T]o be a connoisseur of judging is not
simply to know more about adjudicating than others do. It is also
to be positively disposed toward its internal good, to possess in
some measure a judicial concern for the good the law aims to se-
cure."'125 Of course, judges, lawyers and clients will often have dif-
ferent and conflicting interpretations of what the "good" might be
in any given case. But the most effective advocacy will be framed
in terms of the "good," not just in terms of a client's narrow
interests.
In the context of litigation, concern for the common good would
presume a certain level of complexity. Lawyers probably will not
face an anguished moral decision every ten minutes. 26 It does not
122. See id. at 147.
123. See id. at 152.
124. Id. at 149.
125. I.d. at 150 ("An advocate who hopes to make persuasive arguments to judges
must thus himself share, to some degree, the civic-minded concerns of the judges
before whom he speaks."); Simon, supra note 93, at 1122 (quoting John W. Davis'
"cardinal rule" of advocacy: "Change places (in your imagination of course) with the
Court." The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896 (1940)).
126. Matasar's warning against being a constant "whiner" is good advice: "Consis-
tent refusal to attend to even the most mundane matters within [the] practice because
they are offensive to one's moral views is arrogance of the highest order. To find
immorality in everything others do is to label them, to treat them as moral inferiors,
and to assure that they will feel under attack. One who is set to challenge the status
quo within the practice cannot fight every practice, every position, every action re-
quested. Instead, one must mix humility with common sense, fight only the battles
that are critical to good moral lives, and criticize with care. Such strategic challenges
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mean that every time a plaintiff comes knocking on the door, I
would advise the client to open the corporate coffers. Rather, it
would mean struggling with issues such as whether litigation is the
best way to resolve certain social problems; in certain circum-
stances, the answer to this question may lead to "zealous" advo-
cacy. It may mean struggling with the problematic "public good"
questions that can arise from the interaction between litigation and
lobbying.
What would this principle look like in practice? Consider a
"worst case" scenario-a lawyer who might think she is most justi-
fied in saying, "I have no power, there is nothing I can do. '127
Shelby is a first year litigation associate at a very large firm that
provides legal services to large corporations. Her day to day
legal work consists of very specialized and technical research as-
signments, a hand in drafting sections of motions and briefs, and
sporadic cite-checking colleagues' briefs. Her only contact with
the corporate client is that occasionally one of her research
memoranda winds its way to inside-counsel's desk. Occasionally
she helps with depositions and fact gathering, which brings her
into contact with witnesses, other lawyers, and opposing coun-
sel. Shelby is deeply religious. In fact, because of her religious
convictions, she feels obligated to examine the impact her work
has on the common good. Would this religious conviction have
any application to Shelby's day-to-day work?
What are Shelby's possibilities? On one hand, it is unlikely that
she will be included in conversations of substance about corporate
decisions that could influence the common good. On the other
hand, she is working within the context of a set of relationships:
internal conversations with her colleagues, communications to the
court through briefs and motions, and some contact with other law-
yers and opposing counsel. In each of these contexts Shelby can
bring to bear her concern for the common good.
At some point Shelby's religious views may require her to make
a relatively substantial decision about whether to participate in
representing certain clients. Shelby's firm represents a large corpo-
bolster credibility and assure that a protest will be taken seriously." Matasar, supra
note 67, at 985.
127. See Rhode, Professionalism Problem, supra note 18, at 307 (quoting Benjamin
Sells, Lawyers Aren't as Trapped as They Think, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 5("Many lawyers seem never to have even entertained the idea that they could actually
do something about how law is practiced. A more typical approach seems to be for
lawyers to... become focused primarily on their self interests.., and live their work
lives with a kind of up-and-out fatalism.").
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rate client that continues to produce and profit from products that
she concludes, based on religious and social reflection, contribute
nothing to the common good and actually harm individuals and
society. Assisting in this enterprise, even in the most mundane
tasks, would provoke in her a crisis of conscience. For Shelby, this
decision probably will be among the easier ones. Her firm is smart
enough to have a "conscientious objector" policy, based on which
she may simply refuse assignments which she finds morally offen-
sive and refuse to work for certain clients on the same grounds.
The firm has a large enough client base such that Shelby can be
easily integrated into other work.
Generally, being a junior litigator with an eye to the common
good will most often entail much smaller decisions and gestures -
honesty, personal integrity and a sense of humanity in the day-to-
day tasks of research, gathering and analyzing facts and drafting
pleadings and briefs. "The good lawyer does care about the sound-
ness of the legal order." '128 On one hand, a certain "humility" is
helpful in light of the steep learning curve in many specialized ar-
eas of the law and the fact that there is much to learn about the
practice. But while corporate practice does lead to a certain com-
plex understanding about the nature of social relationships, an
openness to learning in this context does not necessarily require a
"deep humility" about personal values, or a constant "reinvestiga-
tion" of most cherished beliefs in light of a particular corporate
client's goals. 129
In fact, a refusal to constantly "reinvestigate" her values in light
of a client's goals may be Shelby's shortcut to a mature understand-
ing of what it means to be a good lawyer and an effective litigator.
For example, Shelby may receive an assignment from a partner:
"Find me a case that supports this proposition." After hours in the
library and perusing cases on line in an effort to untangle the law in
that particular area, she is convinced that no such case exists and
that the proposition is completely contrary to the existing law. She
faces a decision: try to please the partner who would really like
that case by attempting to construct something based on fuzzy
dicta, or simply deliver the bad news? Honesty, professional integ-
rity and her duty of candor to the court 130 lead Shelby to deliver
the bad news.
128. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 145.
129. Cf. Matasar, supra note 67, at 983.
130. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(3), Candor Toward the Tribunal ("[A] lawyer
shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
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Shelby will probably quickly discover that this is actually what
senior lawyers hope for and expect from junior associates. Perhaps
part of the reason why lawyers have the reputation for bending and
manipulating the law beyond recognition stems not from the prac-
tices of more experienced lawyers, but rather from the fears and
misperceptions of junior lawyers. Teresa Stanton Collett's story
about one of her first assignments is telling. One of the firm's cor-
porate clients had asked about its ability to do something, and the
partner was unsure about the law. Upon receiving the assignment
Collett asked, "I need to know what the client wants to do, in order
to construct an argument that it can do what it wants." The partner
responded:
Teresa, our job is to find out if the law requires the client to act a
particular way. If there is no clear answer under the law, then
you must consider the issues the cases identify as important, as
well as what your own sense of right and wrong tells you. That
is how we decide what advice to give to our clients. This client
has been with the firm a long time, and it deserves the best judg-
ment we can give - not merely permission to do whatever it
wants.13 1
Shelby may even be rewarded for her refusal to be a "yes man."
Her respect for the "internal good" of the law may be appreciated
as a sophisticated, responsible, fully engaged contribution to the
legal analysis or advice.
In the pressure cooker of getting a brief out, this approach may
not always be welcomed. For example, in the process of cite-
checking a brief Shelby may find that a certain case does not ex-
actly support a certain legal proposition. After an open-minded
discussion with a more senior colleague about what the case means,
she may still be convinced that it would be unfair or inaccurate to
cite that case for that proposition. She has little power in her
hands but she can appeal to her own reputation: "This case does
not stand for that proposition. If you decide to leave it in, then
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the lient
131. Teresa Stanton Collett, To Be a Professing Woman, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1051, 1053 (1996); see also GLENDON, supra note 11, at 72-3 (describing a partner's
reaction when Glendon asked how to respond to a deputy's suggestion that she
"make it worth his while" to process a replevin order: "Tell the cretin that Mayer,
Freidlich does not pay public servants for doing jobs that they are already paid by the
taxpayers to do"); Stewart Macaulay, Control, Influence, and Attitudes: A Comment
on Nelson (Symposium on the Corporate Law Firm), 37 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559
(1985) ("[G]ood lawyers seldom will be forced to concede, even to themselves, that
corporate clients want to break the law.").
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take my name off the brief" - if her name was to go on the brief in
the first place. She does the same when she encounters factual ac-
counts that seem exaggerated to the point of unfair distortion.
Shelby would not necessarily need a religious vision of the com-
mon good to arrive at this understanding and application of her
professional obligations. But in moments of pressure, of choosing
between what they might be able to get away with and what is
right, a religious vision of the common good may help Shelby tena-
ciously stick to her principles.
But Shelby's religious vision of the common good brings her be-
yond faithfulness to her professional duties under the ethical codes.
Shelby asks herself tough questions when she encounters argu-
ments that could be legally correct but repugnant to a sense of so-
cial responsibility. She makes an effort to point out the problems
with these arguments. She feels this is a helpful contribution to
effective advocacy, because if the analysis bothers her, it may also
bother the judge or the jury. She refers to her own sense of per-
sonal shame: "If you keep this line of analysis in, I am embarrassed
to be associated with this firm." She sees that these comments oc-
casionally move internal conversations toward a more complex and
sensitive analysis of the issues.
Like Teresa Stanton Collett, Shelby may meet supervisors and
colleagues who strive to consider the common good in their inter-
actions with clients, the court and other lawyers. Some act this way
because of religious conviction, others out of a sense of human de-
cency and still others because this is their understanding of what it
means to be a good lawyer. Shelby watches these lawyers care-
fully, and tries to work with them as much as possible. With certain
supervisors and colleagues, she is able to build up enough of a rela-
tionship of trust such that she can encourage them to talk with her
and with others more openly about why they act the way they do.
With those ho become her friends, she occasionally steers the
lunchtim6 conversation in the direction of this topic.
In the process of corporate defense work, Shelby encounters
many complex and painful situations in which people have been
hurt. In an attempt to deal with these facts on a day to day basis,
Shelby notices that in conversations with colleagues, it is easy to
grow cold or even resort to a certain dark humor. With an eye to
the common good, she gently reminds her friends that there are
human beings involved.
In dealing with opposing counsel, particularly in cases that have
been dragging on for years, Shelby encounters a certain "trench
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warfare" mentality. 132 She tries to understand the tensions in-
volved, but also sees how the approach can generate needless con-
flict and expense. Every so often she suggests, "Why don't we just
ask them nicely." At times this provokes laughter or comments
about her hopeless naivet6, but she notes that occasionally it
changes the tenor of the conversation, and at times even the
approach.
In comparison with the big picture of what seems to make Cor-
porate America tick, Shelby's small gestures of honesty and civility
may seem insignificant. But they are not. They stand as an impor-
tant critique that may generate deeper discussions about the law
firm culture and its interaction with the business culture. Depend-
ing on Shelby's style, certain "no's" said with conviction, courage
and care for the common good and for all the people involved in
the discussion, will be taken not as whining, but rather as openers
for deeper reflection. With time, deeper reflection may lead to
deeper relationships - even to the point of developing into a com-
munity of people who are concerned about the common good.
Such a community, even if small, is a powerful seed for change.
Not everyone will understand. One day Shelby converses with a
colleague at the coffee machine about whether they should use in
an outline for an argument the economic theory "if everyone is
responsible then no one is responsible." As they walk down the
hallway, she asks her colleague, "Can I ask you a question, as a
person? Doesn't that theory bother you, as a person?" The re-
sponse: "That's just because you didn't understand what I was
talking about." Right then and there she cannot come up with a
snazzy legal argument why they should not use that theory in the
analysis. All she can think of is that if the analysis offended her
"regular person" sense of morality, then it might be a non-starter
with a jury. But that conversation never arrives to the point of
discussing, "If everyone is responsible then I am responsible too."
132. Certain scenes in the movie Babe can be an allegory of how lawyers in oppo-
site camps sometimes deal with each other. The scene where the sheepdog is trying to
extract important information from the sheep about the pig Babe's role in an incident
that led to the death of one of the sheep is particularly telling. As the sheepdog faced
the flock, the narrator explained: "Fly [the sheepdog] decided to speak very slowly,
for it was a cold fact of nature that sheep were stupid, and no one would persuade her
otherwise." And in turn, "The sheep spoke very slowly, for it was a cold fact of na-
ture that wolves were ignorant, and nothing would persuade them otherwise." The
effectiveness of the little unprejudiced pig's alternative approach can be a sign of hope
and encouragement. See BABE (Universal 1995).
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Shelby may risk more than being misunderstood. Her "civil dis-
obedience" could be perceived as "whining" which some predict is
"guaranteed to marginalize [you] within the workplace."' 33 If she
keeps it up, she could be risking her long-term career within the
firm. As Deborah Rhode observed, "Where legal partnerships en-
tail lifetime commitments, senior attorneys will understandably be
wary of advancing anyone who might have difficulty 'getting along'
with colleagues or clients. "134
Shelby need not have a sense of religious conviction to take the
risks that she does. But it helps, especially when her decisions may
involve the potential for being marginalized, and ultimately re-
jected. Religion "moves people to give their lives' 1 35 - for not to
take the risk is to let go of what it means to be a person. In the
balance, these risks also make sense when Shelby keeps an eye to-
ward the future. Today she is a junior litigation associate. Eventu-
ally she may assume a position of responsibility, whether as a
partner, as in-house counsel, in government service, or in another
area of the public sector. She may find herself making decisions or
participating in a decision-making process that will have a more
direct impact on the larger community. She may be expected, or at
least allowed more room, to bring to the decision-making process
concerns for the common good.
But if concern for the common good is squelched for years, it is
unrealistic to expect that it suddenly will surface once a person is
vested with more responsibility. Tunnel vision and working with
blinders to the big picture can easily become a habit with drastic
consequences. Like Jiminy Cricket, who keeps walking in the
other direction so long as Pinocchio ignores him,136 a lawyer who
fails to keep before her the impact her work and her advice have
on the common good runs the risk that the voice of her conscience,
ignored for too long, will become softer and softer, and eventually
inaudible. A lawyer who does keep before her the impact her legal
work has on the common good and who does speak up when con-
cerns arise keeps her conscience alive and exercised. A conscience
that is alive and exercised is an important tool, not only for the
present, but also for the future. 137
133. Matasar, supra note 67, at 985.
134. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 22, at 636.
135. Griffin, supra note 94, at 1268 (quoting Jacob Neusner, The Theological Ene-
mies of Religious Studies, 18 RELIGION 21, 24 (1988)).
136. See PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Pictures 1940).
137. Practically, if during her waking hours a lawyer's only point of reference is the
law firm, it may become increasingly difficult to stay attentive to the voice of her
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Conclusion
Many have described the woes of the legal profession, and the
search for new paradigms. The search party is out for the source of
a "[c]ritical mass of men and women with the right stuff to seize the
opportunities and avoid the pitfalls in the current situation. 138
Could a part of this "critical mass" be found in men and women
with a religious vision of the human person and the common good?
Anthony Kronman observed that to resolve the current crisis in
the profession, "What is mainly needed is will - a renewed com-
mitment to this ethic and the courage to make the sacrifices it de-
mands. The key to restoring the profession's failing sense of
identity is thus not some new set of refined intellectual techniques
.... The crucial factor is resolve: the ability to make and stand by
a commitment to serve the public good.' '1 39
Given the overwhelming disincentives to make and to stand by a
commitment to serve the common good, what will be the source of
this resolve? Who possesses "the boldness to make a break with
the reigning paradigm"? 4 ° In short, who has the guts? Perhaps
the time has come for the profession to recognize a hidden source
of will, strength and resolve to make and to stand by a commitment
to serve the common good: lawyers who are inspired by religious
vision, strengthened by religious experience, and willing to act on
this vision.
conscience because of having lost touch with the communities of family and faith
which nourish values and a sense of the common good. Oliver Wendell Holmes's
advice to the "Society of Jobbists," those who wished to avoid the trap of "business
becoming your master and an end it itself," to those who wished to remain "conscious
of ulterior ends," included "strictly controlled" working hours: "for five days alone
will it labor, and the other two are all the members' own." GLENDON, supra note 11,
at 93, 95-6. But not all associates would join the club. See, e.g., Rhode, Professional-
ism Problem, supra note 18, at 309 n.148-49 (discussing Walt Bachman's Law v. Life
account of how associates flocked to other firms when his firm attempted to freeze
both salaries and hours).
138. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 286.
139. KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 365.
140. See GLENDON, supra note 11, at 287.
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